The observation that two theories share the same formal structure, that is, differ only in the interpretation placed on symbols, can almost always be used to simplify a body of knowledge. [Sonnenschein 1968, p. 316] Coase and Hotelling share the distinction of having authored three papers each of which has become a pillar of modern economic theory. However, it appears to have been overlooked that Coase's (1972) paper on the monopoly pricing of a durable good and Hotelling's (1931) We are grateful to Larry Karp, Ana Isabel Saracho, Nancy Stokey, and an anonymous referee for their comments.
paper on the pricing of an exhaustible resource, amended to include a consumer who maximizes her intertemporal utility, "differ only in the interpretation placed on symbols."
This implies that Hotelling's intertemporal arbitrage condition characterizes the equilibrium price trajectory of both Coase's durable good and Hotelling's exhaustible resource, assuming that the durable good monopolist supplier and the exhaustible resource monopsonist consumer, respectively, can credibly resist increasing sales eventually and purchases initially. On the other hand, when the durable good monopolist is unable to commit to a price path, Coase's conjecture that patient, strategic consumers drive the initial price down to its competitive level applies equally to patient, strategic sellers driving the resource price up to its consumer's choke level.
Both the Coase conjecture and Hotelling's fundamental no-arbitrage exhaustible resource pricing equation have been refined and extended. Stokey (1981) , Bulow (1982) , Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) , Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) , and Bagnoli, Salant, and Swierzbinski (1989) are among the most widely known for formalizing and qualifying the Coase conjecture. Stiglitz (1976) provides a concise restatement of the exhaustible resource extraction problem under monopoly and under perfect competition, and Hartwick (1993) generalizes Hotelling's optimal extraction equation to the case of a semidurable good. Stewart (1980) and others study a durable good whose supply is exhaustible, a case to which both Coase's and Hotelling's contributions apply.
Our perspective is different. We observe that the assumed infinite durability of the good in Coase's model that implies the eventual exhaustibility of its demand and the assumed finiteness of the perishable good's stock in Hotelling's model that implies the eventual exhaustion of its supply together suggest that the optimal pricing problems in the two models are mirror images of each other. In the durable good model the monopolist supplier plays the role of the Stackelberg leader to the consumers' role as followers, whereas in the exhaustible resource model the monopsonist consumer plays the Stackelberg leader role to the resource suppliers' follower role. We show that these two optimization problems under full commitment mirror each other.
I. Formal Structure
The durable good monopolist is commonly described as a single seller serving a market for an infinitely durable good that is demanded only in quantities of zero or one by a continuum of consumers, indexed by . These consumers' preferences are specified by a mon- 
The consumers' maximization (1b) is equivalent to the arbitrage condition along the optimal path dp t p r[p
Coase pointed out that the solution to problem (1) is not time-consistent: if the monopolist cannot credibly commit, she is tempted to decrease the durable goods price sooner than the commitment price path dictates, in order to increase her sales and profits. Rational consumers anticipate this and postpone purchasing unless the initial price is low enough. According to the conjecture, when the length of time for which the seller can commit shrinks to zero, the initial price set by the monopolist tends to its competitive level.
For the Hotelling model, we follow its development by Dasgupta and Heal (1979) , further studied by Maskin and Newbery (1990) and Karp and Newbery (1993) . There is a single importer (or several importers collectively behaving as a monopsonist) deciding on a profile of import tariffs (prices) to impose on the exhaustible resource supplied by competitive sellers. There is one unit of the resource initially. Let be S t defined as the stock of the resource already extracted, the total cost c(S )S 
t t‫ޒ‬
The maximization in (2b) yields Hotelling's fundamental intertemporal arbitrage condition for exhaustible resource pricing:
If the average cost of extraction is not constant, current sales increase the cost of future extraction because they lower the future stock. We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Problems (1) and (2) (2) gives U (1). (Because adding an arbitrary constant to both the reservation values and the cost of production does not affect the sequences maximizing [1], adding a large positive constant to both and guarantees their P ḡ nonnegativity.) The other direction should be apparent. Stokey (1981) , Gul et al. (1986) , Ausubel and Deneckere (1989), and Thépot (1998) have established conditions under which the Coase conjecture is valid. Informally, the conjecture holds if (1) the production cost g is linear and either (2a) attention is restricted to stationary strategies or (2b) consumers' valuations are bounded away from marginal cost. The corresponding restrictions in the exhaustible resource model are therefore that (1 ) the monopsonist's utility U is linear and either (2a ) attention is restricted to stationary strategies or (2b ) the producers' marginal cost is bounded away from the marginal utility. Under these conditions, the price of the resource rises sharply when producers are patient enough. If the durable good monopolist can commit and faces a linear production cost, problem (1) has a degenerate solution in which the monopolist makes a single sale. Similarly, if the monopsonist can commit and has a linear utility function, problem (2) has a degenerate solution in which the monopsonist makes a single purchase.
II. Interpretation
The Coase conjecture need not hold when costs are nonlinear (Kahn 1986) or under depreciation (Bond and Samuelson 1984; Sobel 1991) . These conclusions thus apply to the Hotelling model when U is nonlinear or when the resource is renewable.
Finally, Gul (1987) and others study durable good oligopolists and establish a folk theorem in subgame-perfect strategies. This corresponds to the case of several strategic, importing countries, as studied by Bergstrom (1982) . Conversely, the resource pricing by a monopsony with fringe buyers, extensively studied in resource economics, parallels the situation of a dominant seller of a durable good.
